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SAS 34 Procedures vs. Forecast Reviews: 
The Gap in GAAS 
Robert S. Kay 
Touche Ross & Co. 
Overview of the Paper 
This paper explores the guidance given to auditors in early 1981 in SAS 34, 
"The Auditor's Considerations when a Question Arises About an Entity's 
Continued Existence," in comparison with procedures contained in the 
AICPA's 1980 Guide for a Review of a Financial Forecast ("forecast guide"). 
In the author's opinion, there is little differentiation in the satisfaction the 
auditor/reviewer is to obtain under these two forms of guidance, and the result 
may be that the auditor will be called upon for failure to have performed at the 
level of the forecast guide. Neither document has been in existence long 
enough for such problems to have matured, but based on the evolution of 
accountants' liability, the author foresees significant challenges in court unless 
the auditing profession promptly reconciles the two documents. 
It is important to recognize that the forecast guide calls for a display of the 
most probable future result, which could be considerably more difficult to 
achieve than the prediction implied by SAS 34—that is, that a company will 
have zero or better net cash inflow, without identifying any specific amount 
thereof. To this extent, one would expect the forecast guide procedures to be 
more penetrating. Accordingly, this paper knowingly makes a more aggressive 
case than probably is applicable for audits today. 
The views expressed in this paper are a priori, fortified by experience with 
several practice cases where the auditor recognized the problem and aimed at 
the forecast guide levels of attainment, believing this was the prudent approach 
in the clients' circumstances. In this sense, the author offers thoughts on what 
he perceives to be an emerging problem facing the auditing profession. 
Experienced accountants can be expected to disagree on whether a problem is 
emerging, and if so, how to solve it. 
A Gathering Storm 
In the current economic environment, businesses face an unprecedented 
and sustained liquidity crisis; failures are common and increasing. Consider for 
example the thrift industry, which in an unregulated environment (without 
FSLIC or FDIC assistance) would be faced with cataclysmic disaster through 
having lent long and borrowed short. Should the auditor be exceptionally alert 
in these circumstances? How much responsibility will have to be borne for 
these failures? 
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The authoritative auditing literature is liberally sprinkled with exculpations 
declaring that the auditor is not a fortune teller. For example, SAS 34, 
paragraph 9, says: 
The auditor's function, however, does not include predicting the 
outcome of future events, and an unqualified opinion on the financial 
statements does not constitute a guarantee or assurance by the auditor 
that the entity has the ability to continue for any particular period 
beyond the date of his opinion. 
Experience shows that auditors should not take too much comfort in soothing 
passages of this type. The litigable issue will not be identified as the future 
orientation, but rather as the proper assessment of available facts (with 
"available" meaning discoverable through the "right" inquiries and investiga-
tion). 
Legal Framework 
Legal precedent over the years has developed to a point that auditors can 
expect to be called to task in the event a company fails. This is especially so for 
publicly held companies, given the opportunity to assert misrepresentations in 
the financial statements and the accompanying auditor's report under Section 
11 of the 1933 Securities Act. This puts the burden of proof on the auditor as 
not being a party to whatever is alleged to be wrong with the financial 
statements (i.e., the auditor did not determine that the company was about to 
fail); and the test for auditor non-culpability is stringent: 
After making reasonable investigation (i.e., exercising "due dili-
gence"), he had reasonable ground to believe, and did in fact believe, 
that the statements in his audit opinion were true; in effect, the auditor 
will be held liable unless he can prove that he exercised due care, i.e., 
was not negligent either in the performance of his audit or in the 
expression of his audit opinion (which is indeed a rigorous standard 
though not insurmountable).1 
When considering going concern situations, the focus is on the future, or 
the post-balance-sheet period. If a company files a registration statement, 
Section 11(a) of the 1933 Securities Act is unique in continuing the audit opinion 
responsibility to the effective date of the registration statement, rather than 
only to the date of the audit opinion. "It is possible that the information 
available to the auditor at the audit opinion date might justify one audit opinion, 
but that additional information available to the auditor at or near the effective 
date might then require a different audit opinion."2 The professional literature 
does not require a post-balance-sheet investigation to be as rigorous as the 
audit examination, but how much should have been enough is always debatable 
in the aftermath of a collapse. 
Admittedly, companies in a noticeably precarious financial position and 
therefore candidates for going concern qualification are not likely to be filing 
1933 Act registration statements.3 But there is, as ever, an easy route that 
plaintiffs may take strictly based on periodic filings under the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act. Section 10(b) prohibits the making of any untrue statement of a 
material fact or omission of a statement of material fact necessary in order to 
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make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading. Rule 10b-5 deals with any offer or sale of 
securities, and has been interpreted to apply to any action taken in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security. Thus, the rule has been construed 
broadly enough so that auditors' opinions on audited financial statements, and 
unaudited financial statements with which auditors have become associated, 
may be statements in connection with purchases and sales of the corporation's 
securities. The auditor is clearly "in the soup" even though he is not in the 
securities brokerage business. 
The auditor is also not required to actively participate in or know about the 
presentation of misleading statements. The profession's euphoria over the 
Hochfelder decision, requiring the auditor to have scienter or "knowledge" to 
be held responsible, has rapidly dissipated. Scienter has been transmogrified 
into recklessness, a form of negligence, a prevalent definition of which is found 
in McLean vs. Alexander4: 
Reckless conduct may be defined as . . . highly unreasonable [conduct], 
involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an 
extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which 
presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to 
the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it. 
This may sound safe—what good auditor does that?—but in terms of going 
concern situations, one must at least wonder about whether some of today's 
situations will be deemed after the fact to have been "so obvious that the actor 
must have been aware of it." 
One last bit of relevant law: a determination of failure to have made the 
inquiry that might have revealed a deficiency is negligence; if it is sufficiently 
extreme it could be recklessness. 
It is tempting to assert that today, SEC enforcement is rapidly waning, and 
that litigation for the most part is running much in the accountants' favor. That 
would be, perhaps, foolhardy; the SEC retains all its powers and must be 
counted on to reactivate enforcement if a serious failure of auditors is 
perceived. Once the SEC "rings the gong," the litigants will swarm. 
Auditors and Uncertainties 
Uncertainties clearly existed in financial reporting long before auditors 
came into being. Thus, the consideration of effects of uncertainties on clients' 
financial statements has been an evolutionary process. An early exposition of 
this subject is contained in Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 32, "Qualifi-
cations and Disclaimers," issued in 1962 for purposes of clarifying reporting 
standards called for under what was then Rule 2.03 of the AICPA's Code of 
Professional Ethics. That ethical conclusion was intended to add further 
specification to the fourth standard of reporting (which was subsequently added 
to the nine original Generally Accepted Auditing Standards) indicating that "the 
report should contain a clear-cut indication of the character of the auditor's 
examination, if any, and the degree of responsibility he is taking." 
The language of SAP 32 was carried forward into SAP 33, "Codification of 
Statement on Auditing Procedures," and, in substance, remained relatively 
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intact in the recodification in SAS 1 in 1972. However, the recodification 
procedure and the litigation against auditors in the early 1970's revealed a need 
for further attention to the auditor's forms of reporting including uncertainties. 
The result was the issuance of SAS 2, "Reports on Audited Financial 
Statements," in 1974. These are essentially the reporting formats we practice 
under today. 
SAS 34, "The Auditor's Considerations When a Question Arises About an 
Entity's Continued Existence," does not alter the basic format in SAS 2; the 
SAS 34 exemplary report showing a qualification ("subject to," as contrasted 
with disclaimer) in a going concern situation is built on the preexisting SASs and 
gives specification to what otherwise might be a stock "fill-in-the-blanks" form 
of report. 
Prior to SAS 34, auditing pronouncements seemed to heavily emphasize 
the financial statements—much as if they were disembodied from the company. 
SAS 34 appears to aim much more directly at the company itself—will it make 
it, or will it not? While SAS 34 necessarily hinges the auditor's concerns to the 
only outlet he controls—his audit report—and thus to the financial statements, 
it is apparent by reading SAS 34 that the issue of how to report is simple in 
comparison with what the auditor has to consider and do in relation to future 
oriented information, almost all of which is not incorporated in the client's 
accounting records. Only then can a conclusion be reached about including or 
not including a going concern qualification (or disclaimer) in the auditor's 
report. 
SAS 34 vs. the Forecasting Guide 
The basic premise of SAS 34 is that, any time up to the date of the report, 
once the auditor becomes aware (through what is referred to as "contrary 
information"), that the going concern assumption may be in question, regard-
less of the source of the information, the auditor had better investigate to de-
termine whether (and how) the report needs to be amended to make reference 
to the situation. 
Let us assume that auditors today are especially conscious about and 
inquire into a client's continued viability, rather than awaiting inspiration or 
evidence to come marching in. Whether or not such preconditioning is true, the 
focal issue is, once the auditor is concerned, what procedures should the 
auditor follow in considering a client's continued viability. Further, recognizing 
that prognostications could be wrong (i.e., some going concerns will become 
non-going concerns), what will the courts decide about the reasonable level of 
performance? Said differently, auditors make judgments and some judgments 
are invariably wrong. The auditor needs to support judgment with the proper 
defense, which could very well be something more penetrating than having 
followed SAS 34. That "something" probably will be the AICPA's 1980 Guide 
for Review of a Financial Forecast. 
Some questions that might be asked about SAS 34 and the forecast guide 
are: 
• What "forecasting" procedures are implied by SAS 34? 
• In a SAS 34 situation, can the auditor simply "throw in the towel" 
and issue his "going concern" opinion after coursing through minimal 
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procedures, or are there situations in which review must be con-
ducted to the extent contemplated in a review of a financial forecast? 
• Under what circumstances would a prudent auditor expand SAS 34 
procedures to incorporate some or all of the procedures for review of 
a financial forecast? 
• How large is the gap between what the auditor already knows and 
does in an SAS 34 engagement and the knowledge and procedures 
called for in the forecast guide? 
A comparison of the relevant forecast guide requirements with SAS 34 
considerations follows, stated in terms of the forecast guide procedures, with 
reference to the substance of coverage in SAS 34. Particular reference should 
be made to paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of SAS 34, reproduced in Appendix A. 
Forecast Guide SAS 34 
Definitions 
• The forecast and underlying as-
sumptions are the responsibility of 
management, regardless of the ac-
countant's participation. 
• The accountant may assist in the 
formulation of assumptions, but 
management must evaluate them 
and make decisions as to their rea-
sonableness. 
The Accountant's Review 
• In general, the forecast reviewer 
should: 
-have adequate technical training 
and expertise 
-maintain an independence of men-
tal attitude 
-exercise due professional care 
-adequately plan and supervise the 
engagement 
-understand the forecasting proc-
ess 
-obtain adequate support for the 
conclusions reached. 
• The scope of the accountant's re-
view is governed by the following: 
-knowledge of the business, focusing 
on its operating characteristics, 
the nature and condition of sales 
• This would be a given in any en-
vironment, whether in an audit ex-
amination or review of a forecast. 
• Nothing revelationary. Just as in an 
audit, the auditor can assist the 
company and management in se-
lecting accounting policies, but 
management makes the decision. 
The Auditor's Considerations 
• Except for the possibility that the 
level of technical expertise needed 
in a forecast engagement is greater, 
the remainder of these qualities are 
GAAS-oriented and would be im-
plicit in a SAS 34 engagement. 
-This is required by SAS 1, Plan-
ning and Supervision (AU 311). 
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• A forecast is the "most probable" 
estimate. 
• A projection may or may not be 
representative of the "most proba-
ble" estimate. 
No definitions of forecast or proj-
ection; mentions both. 
Management's Responsibilities 
markets, unique industry charac-
teristics and patterns of past per-
formance. 
-management's forecasting experi-
ence, including review of past fore-
casts and related actual results. 
-forecast period, including consid-
eration of the forecast period's 
length and extent of inclusion of 
historical results. 
-forecasting process, the knowledge 
of which is based on inquiry, ob-
servations and review of docu-
mentation. 
• Procedures to evaluate assumptions: 
-based on knowledge of the busi-
ness, identify key factors that in-
fluence the company's financial 
results. This considers their rele-
vance, completeness, sensitivity 
in relation to financial results, and 
pervasiveness. 
-evaluate whether the assumptions 
are suitably supported. 
-no conclusion can be drawn by the 
accountant as to whether the fore-
cast is the "most probable" out-
come. Management's intentions 
and inherent uncertainties of fore-
casts necessarily place this conclu-
sion on management's plate. 
-the assumptions to be focused 
upon are those that are material, 
especially sensitive to variations, 
deviate from historical trends, or 
are uncertain. 
-the adequacy of support for as-
sumptions is based on: 
(1) existence of sufficient perti-
nent sources. 
(2) whether assumptions are con-
sistent with their sources. 
(3) whether historical or other fi-
nancial information and data 
are reliable. 
(4) whether the historical financial 
or other data are comparable 
or whether differences were 
factored in. 
There is nothing here that the auditor 
shouldn't already know to a certain 
degree. 
-No specific requirement, but it is 
common sense. Would an auditor 
look at and believe a cash forecast 
without some level of inquiry 
about management's forecasting 
experience. 
-Again, this would seem to be in 
the area of logical inquiry by the 
auditor. 
-This is not required in SAS 34; it 
requires more than inquiry by the 
auditor. 
-In view of the "knowledge bank'' 
possessed by the auditor, these 
factors should probably already be 
known, even in a non-SAS 34 en-
gagement, though undoubtedly in 
a less formalized way than con-
templated in the forecasting guide. 
-This is not REQUIRED by SAS 34 
and would require some digging by 
the auditor. 
-Same under GAAS. Rule 201 of 
the AICPA Code of Professional 
Ethics prohibits vouching for the 
achievability of a forecast. 
-SAS 34 emphasis is identical. 
-SAS 34 requires review and com-
parison of the prospective infor-
mation with past prospective 
information, historical financial in-
formation, and the accuracy of 
past prospective information. Fur-
ther, omissions of relevant infor-
mation and assumptions should be 
noted. This would encompass at 
least points (3) and (4) at left. 
Further, points (5), (6) and (7) 
would seem a logical extension of 
any review of a forecast. 
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(5) whether the assumptions are 
consistent with each other. 
(6) whether the logical argument 
or theory, considered with the 
assumptions, is reasonable. 
(7) whether alternate approaches 
support the reasonableness of 
the assumptions. 
In a SAS 34 situation, the auditor must address all of the factors considered 
in that statement prior to drawing a conclusion about an entity's continued 
existence. This implies that the auditor's procedures for review of forecasts, 
projections, etc. prepared in conjunction with an audit of financial statements 
should be thorough and complete. 
As the table above suggests, the detailed procedures called for in the 
forecast guide can be viewed as simply a logical and necessary articulation of 
the generalized procedures contained in SAS 34. In most cases, it would seem 
imprudent of the auditor to ignore the guide's suggested approach and 
procedures—they are formalized in an AICPA document written for account-
ants, not management consultants, and arguably should serve as the basis for 
the general procedures described in paragraph 7, 8 and 9 of SAS 34. 
The only procedures stated in the forecast guide that are not direct and 
logical articulations of the SAS 34 approach are (a) knowledge of the forecasting 
process, and (b) evaluation as to whether the forecast assumptions are suitably 
supported. Something to keep in mind—the forecast guide implies the auditor 
should possess a certain level of knowledge about the entity and about 
forecasting. With the possible exception of a technical aptitude for forecast 
reviews based on experience, the knowledge required of an auditor in a 
forecasting engagement is not different from the knowledge required by GAAS 
in a SAS 34 engagement (or, for that matter, any audit).5 
Analysis of Differences 
The dimensions of the difference between SAS 34 and the forecast guide 
can be classified into four areas: 
1. Nature of procedures 
2. Extent of procedures (degree and quality of evidence obtained) 
3. Severity of opinion (or lack thereof) 
4. Extent of client disclosures. 
169 
Management Representations 
• Should be in writing and acknowl-
edge management's responsibility 
for both the forecast and underlying 
assumptions 
• SAS 34 does not mention written 
representations. However, such 
representations would seem called 
for anyway in an audit engagement 
representations letter, at least to 
back up management's disclosures 
within the financial statements 
about the effect of uncertainties on 
the company's future. 
Overall, the nature of procedures in either document is not that different, 
but SAS 34 is sufficiently non-imperative (i.e., "consider this; consider that") 
to permit a sincere case to be made by an auditor that reasonable procedural 
compliance with SAS 34 consists simply of a grasp of the situation and oral 
management representations. 
Nature of Procedures. Differences between SAS 34 coverage and the 
nature of forecast review guide procedures lie in, (i) knowledge of the client's 
forecasting system, and (ii) the extent of articulation of the assumptions. 
The audit client may not even have thought about having a forecasting or 
projection system, having no intention of ever publishing any such prospective 
data. Given that the auditor likewise is not planning on publicly reporting on the 
client's forecast, the extent (or lack) of sophistication of the forecasting 
"system" is probably secondary. What has to be of most concern to the 
auditor is the thoroughness, logic and credibility of the assumptions, and the 
correctness of calculations. While these are more difficult to deal with absent a 
formal system, they are nevertheless susceptible of analysis and understand-
ing. Hopefully, the courts will not hold an auditor (or the company) deficient for 
the company's failure to have developed a formal forecasting system that 
generates data designed to show that the company will or will not go out of 
business. Being on the brink of disaster does not usually warrant the 
expenditure to establish and run a forecasting system. Thus, we will leave this 
issue, simply recognizing that without a system, the numbers and assumptions 
become more subjective. 
To be able to better understand the client's conclusion, a good deal more 
articulation of assumptions might be needed. Though management may intuit 
an assumption, the numerous subassumptions must be communicated to an 
auditor, explicitly or implicitly, to permit focusing on their reasonableness and 
the type of evidence that may be available. 
Extent of Procedures. SAS 34 identifies its procedures as "considerations.'' 
Most are listed in terms of "may" rather than "should." The exception lies in 
paragraph 9, requiring discussion with management about available forecasts, 
projections, budgets or other prospective data, particularly data relating to 
future cash flows. However, this paragraph does not require management to 
actually produce this information; the only standard is that it must be 
information that can reasonably be developed and that whatever is proffered is 
relevant. "Reasonable" will remain undefined except when a situation is 
litigated to a conclusion. 
Paragraph 9 addresses the auditor thus: "The auditor should consider the 
support for significant assumptions underlying the prospective data and should 
give particular attention to assumptions that are material to the relevant 
forecasts or projections, [are] especially uncertain or sensitive to variations, 
[and that deviate] from historical trends." This sounds imperative, but it is 
immediately diluted by directing the auditor to base his considerations on: 
a. Reading, 
b. Knowledge of the entity, its business and its management, and 
c. Analytical comparison of past, present and future data. 
Even after doing these minimal procedures, the only admonition is this: "If 
the auditor becomes aware of relevant factors, the effects of which are not 
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reflected in such prospective data, he should also take those factors into 
account." 
The forecast guide is much more specific about what the accountant must 
do. He must consider the following matters (page 9): 
1. Whether sufficient pertinent sources of information about the as-
sumptions have been considered. Examples of external sources the 
accountant might consider are government publications, industry 
publications, economic forecasts, existing or proposed legislation, 
and reports of changing technology. Examples of internal sources are 
budgets, labor agreements, patents, royalty agreements, engineer-
ing studies, historical financial statements and records, sales backlog 
records, debt agreements, and board of directors actions involving 
entity plans. 
2. Whether the assumptions are consistent with the sources from 
which they are derived. 
3. Whether the assumptions are consistent with each other. 
The remaining three considerations (not listed above) are equivalent to those in 
SAS 34. 
After this list of considerations in the forecast guide, there are two 
particularly incisive paragraphs about items probably infrequently considered in 
performing SAS 34 procedures. These state (page 10): 
Support for assumptions may include market surveys, engineering 
studies, general economic indicators, industry statistics, trends and 
patterns developed from an entity's operating history, and internal data 
and analyses, accompanied by their supporting logical argument or 
theory. The accountant may also obtain support during the evaluation of 
the forecasting process. Support for a forecast can range from informa-
tion based on informed opinion (such as economists' estimates of the 
inflation rate) to data that can be tested in traditional ways (such as 
completed transactions). 
In addition to evaluating management's assumptions and their sources 
of information, the accountant should consider using alternative ap-
proaches to the development of assumptions in evaluating the fore-
casted amounts. For example, to test management's forecast of 
aggregate sales developed from individual salesmen's estimates, the 
accountant may employ a historical trend estimate. 
The forecast guide also contains detailed illustrative procedures, many of 
which would be most apropos in a going concern situation. 
It is almost obvious that SAS 34 studiously avoided a requirement that 
evidence be obtained. There are striking similarities between the going 
concern discussion in Auditing Research Monograph 1 and the content of SAS 
34, but ARM 1 ". . . deals almost entirely with the going-concern concept as it 
affected the evidence-gathering aspects of the examination."6 A typical 
passage about evidence reads: 
Evidence that financing or operating problems have been mitigated may 
remove the immediate threat to the continued existence of a company. 
Financing problems may be mitigated by a waiver or default or an 
anticipated influx of funds. If there is sufficient competent evidential 
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matter that the terms of indebtedness will be adjusted or if an 
arrangement actually deferring payment is obtained, the peril to the 
continued existence of the company may be removed. An anticipated 
influx of funds—if supported by evidential matter—may also remove the 
peril of liquidation. The influx may be from a variety of sources, such as 
demonstrated ability to continue borrowing, the obligation or desire of a 
related entity not to allow liquidation, or viable alternatives open to 
management in financing operations. 
Evidence indicating successful future operations may be in the form of 
reliable company plans or budgets, or operational or management 
changes essential to a "turn-around" of operations. To a large extent 
the auditor's ability to evaluate operating problems will depend on the 
extent of his past experience with the company's operations. The 
auditor's ability to determine the reasonableness of management's 
estimates will be influenced both by the company's experience and his 
own evaluation of management's objectivity and knowledgeability con-
cerning the subject of estimation.7 
Accountant's Forecast Report Vs. Auditor's Report. It is logical that the 
major difference between SAS 34 procedures and forecast guide procedures 
lies in the extent of evidentiary support obtained, because the form of forecast 
report does not allow for degrees of related uncertainty to be reflected in the 
wording. The forecast guide states (page 25): 
Limitations on the scope of the review, whether imposed by the client 
or by other circumstances, may require the accountant to state in his 
report that he cannot evaluate the presentation of the forecast or assess 
whether the assumptions provide a reasonable basis for management's 
forecast. 
Further, a scope limitation includes one that is imposed "by circumstances, 
such as the accountant's inability to evaluate significant assumption(s) because 
they are not suitably supported." What this effectively amounts to is a 
disclaimer of opinion on the forecast—no "subject to" opinions. 
When this condition occurs, the accountant is required to state: 
Since, as described in the preceding paragraph, we are unable to 
evaluate management's assumption regarding . . . and other assump-
tions that depend thereon, we express no conclusion with respect to 
the presentation of the accompanying financial forecast. 
If this is where the auditor would end up after applying the forecast guide 
procedures in an audit going concern situation, should he say so, in addition to 
expressing a qualified opinion or disclaimer of opinion? 
It could be asserted (perhaps it was even intended) that the auditor's SAS 
34 approach in reporting on the examination of financial statements affords an 
appropriate opportunity to do less—because the auditor of historical financial 
statements seems to have more options about how much uncertainty he should 
accept before expressing other than an unqualified opinion. 
SAS 34 seems to excuse the auditor from doing a great deal of work before 
considering the effects of going concern conditions on his report. Paragraph 11 
states: "After making any substantive tests that the auditor considers 
necessary and practicable to assess such information, factors, and plans" the 
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auditor could reach a conclusion that the audit report need not be modified; 
then again, modification might not be necessary. Further, paragraph 11 alludes 
to what the auditor might do upon concluding that the company is not a going 
concern: "Identifying the point at which uncertainties about recoverability, 
classifications, and amounts require the auditor to modify his report is a 
complex professional judgment." An example follows in paragraph 12 of an 
opinion qualified for going-concern reasons, perhaps hinting at that course of 
action. 
SAS 34 is silent on whether a disclaimer of opinion might be appropriate 
because of the magnitude of uncertainties, but defers, by reference to SAS 2 
(including the particular paragraph that [by footnote] does not prohibit the 
auditor from expressing a disclaimer). SAS 2 indicates: 
The committee believes that the explanation of the uncertainties and 
the qualification of the auditor's opinion contemplated by this section 
should serve adequately to inform the users of financial statements. 
Nothing in this section, however, is intended to preclude an auditor 
from declining to express an opinion in cases involving uncertainties. If 
he disclaims an opinion, the uncertainties and their possible effects on 
the financial statements should be disclosed in an appropriate manner, 
and the auditor's report should give all the substantive reasons for his 
disclaimer of opinion. (AU 509.25, footnote 8.) 
Thus, there is absolutely nothing in the professional literature demanding a 
disclaimer of opinion as a signal for increasing the user's perception of the 
severity of the situation. 
Assume that following SAS 34 procedures, the auditor does not gather a 
great deal of independent evidence about the veracity of the client's assump-
tions used in a projection that indicates a workout of the going concern 
situation. Also assume that the auditor issues a "subject to going concern" 
opinion as exemplified in SAS 34. After all, SAS 34 does not contain mandates. 
Will it be sustainable by the auditor, should the company shortly thereafter 
enter bankruptcy, that all professional standards applicable to the audit were 
fully adhered to? Would this be true if inquiry outside the company, such as 
with suppliers, customers, trade associations, etc., or analysis of competitors' 
strengths, could have indicated rather clearly that the company was going to be 
unable to achieve the assumptions indicated in its projections? Would, in such a 
circumstance, it be a better defense to have expressed a disclaimer of opinion? 
A disclaimer may not serve to further insulate the accountant if procedures 
were, under the circumstances, less than might have been expected (i.e., "the 
Standard of practice in the community"). Said differently, the auditor could 
argue the impossibility of objectively auditing the future (so why try too hard?); 
and that therefore there was justification for expressing such inability through a 
stronger form of negative opinion—i.e., a disclaimer. 
If indeed the major assumptions are opaque—for example, a certain level of 
interest rate must be achieved on the company's borrowings or financing needs 
in the future, or the company's new product needs to be a success in order for 
the company to survive, the auditor is well advised to spell out these problems 
in his report, regardless of which kind of opinion or non-opinion is expressed. It 
is not as though the courts would hold the auditor responsible for having 
attested to such items if there was a failure to express the inability to do so, but 
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it could be held that readers were not sufficiently informed of the sensitivity of 
the assumptions to have been able to reason along with the auditor towards the 
conclusion reached. In the end, failure to have adequately communicated to 
users can be as fatal as the unlikely determination that the auditor should have 
used a crystal ball. 
Extent of Disclosure 
Naturally, the client should make all the necessary disclosures attendant to 
its circumstances. In those situations where neither the company nor the 
auditor express any concern about ability to continue to operate, and the 
company shortly thereafter fails, both are undoubtedly in jeopardy. What if, 
however, the company expresses (in its Management Discussion and Analysis 
portion of the annual report) that it foresees serious problems in the future, and 
while not being fatalistic about it in detail, puts in enough clues about dangers to 
continuation of the business? If under those circumstances the auditor 
addresses the situation via SAS 34 and concludes that a going concern 
qualification is not necessary, the auditor could be targeted in the event of 
business failure. It would seem that the auditor's opinion should be no better 
than the company's representations wherever made, even if it takes some 
effort to sort out exactly what the company is saying. 
Sometimes the auditor in reviewing the company's situation may decide it 
is in sufficient danger to merit a going concern qualification, but the company 
does not agree, and refuses to paint the picture nearly so black as does the 
auditor's report. In the event of subsequent failure, presumably the company 
would then be in greater jeopardy than the auditor. 
Forecasting has evolved a great deal in the past 10 years, commencing with 
the SEC's removal of its fiat against forward-looking information. Despite SEC 
allurements (e.g., safe harbor provisions) to companies to publish forecasts or 
prospective financial information, very few companies have done so. The SEC 
recently came at it in other ways, by encouraging companies to put prospective 
data in the MD&A section, as well as by permitting prospective information in 
pro forma statements. 
A question worth asking is whether companies should regularly begin 
publishing, or at least preparing, forecasts in a uniform manner, making it 
possible for the auditor to apply a consistent set of procedures. Given the 
current economic malaise, most corporate managers must be thinking as far 
forward as possible, even if on scraps of paper. It would be far better that these 
be formalized. 
Conclusion 
Under today's conditions, is it reasonable for an auditor, when considering 
a client's going concern status, to do less than the "maximum" for which the 
profession has provided guidance? I believe there is a significant chance the 
auditor will be held responsible for not doing this, and it is time for the 
profession to close the gap. 
There are numerous faltering companies today, whose entire asset/liability 
structure may be inconsequential in view of the risks involved in non-
continuation as a going concern in the future. It seems the auditor is in a 
174 
precarious position if the forecast guide procedures are not performed— 
complete with market research, use of outside economists, industry data, etc. 
Admittedly, an auditor would not be in a position to report on the forecast 
because the reporting requirements thereunder allow only positive opinions or 
no opinions. But perhaps the auditor should be permitted to report, using a 
qualified forecast opinion, when in an audit framework. Such an approach might 
even qualify for SEC safe-harbor treatment—far preferable to the expertised 
status of an accountant's report containing merely a going-concern qualifica-
tion. Likewise, forecasts need not be updated if there is no stated undertaking 
to do so. Perhaps this feature could somehow blunt the impact of the auditor's 
responsibility for subsequent events. 
The auditing profession indeed faces a gap in GAAS. At a minimum, a 
pronouncement is needed explaining the difference between SAS 34 and the 
forecast guide; the situation is not clear to auditors as it now stands.8 
Footnotes 
1. This annotated excerpt from Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act is taken from Cormley, R. 
James, "Auditing and the Law," Chapter 46 in Handbook of Accounting and Auditing, edited by 
John C. Burton, Russell E . Palmer and Robert S. Kay. Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1981, 
p. 46-26. Several other thoughts in this brief overview of legal considerations also come from this 
source. 
2. Ibid., p. 46-29. 
3. ASR 115 excludes companies that have an imminent threat of failure from offering securities 
under the 1933 Act. Yet, firms not reported to be in immediate danger can (and do) register for 
"shelf" purposes even though they might not be strong enough to have a public offering for cash. 
4. 599 F.2d 1190, 1196-1197 (3d Cir. 1979). 
5. For example, SAS 22, Planning and Supervision, states that: 
The auditor should obtain a level of knowledge of an entity's business that will enable him 
to conduct his examination in accordance with GAAS. That level should enable him to 
understand events, transactions and practices that may significantly affect the financial 
statements. Knowledge of an entity's business helps the auditor in evaluating the 
reasonableness of estimates and management representations. In addition, the auditor 
should have knowledge of the nature of the entity's business, organization and operating 
characteristics and matters affecting the entity's industry. Sources of this knowledge 
encompass data internal and external to the entity (AU 311.06-.08). [Emphasis added.] 
6. Carmichael, D. R. Chapter 6, "Pervasive Uncertainties—Going Concern Problems," in The 
Auditor's Reporting Obligation, Auditing Research Monograph 1. New York: AICPA, p. 109. 
7. Ibid., p. 99. 
8. Kent St. Pierre and James Anderson, in "An Analysis of Audit Failures Based on 
Documented Legal Cases," Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, Spring 1982, state (p. 
243): 
The [Cohen] Commission's staff concluded that audit failures were not a result of 
deficiencies in auditing standards. Fifteen percent of the errors classified in this study 
pertained to the interpretation of auditing standards. Although the interpretation of 
accounting principles and the implementation of auditing procedures accounted for a 
larger percentage of errors, the 15 percent figure is significant. The staff stated that 
failures in this area were most frequently traceable to departures by auditors from the 
standards. 
The key issue seems to be whether the departure was intentional or whether the auditor 
misinterpreted what the study group felt was a clear set of standards. The staff's 
conclusion cannot be refuted based upon the analysis conducted here, but there is enough 
available evidence to question the statement that no deficiencies exist in the standards. If 
the standards are vague and open to misinterpretation, it is difficult to accept the 
argument that the standards are adequate and raise the level of auditor performance. The 
results of this study indicate that interpretation errors are common, even for auditors 
familiar with the general standards. 
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Appendix 
SAS 34 Excerpt 
Consideration of Contrary Information and Mitigating Factors 
7. The auditor's initial consideration of contrary information focuses on the 
underlying conditions that resulted in the contrary information (for example, 
whether the conditions are indicative of a rapid or a gradual deterioration, 
whether they are temporary or recurring, whether they are susceptible of 
corrective actions solely within the entity, and whether they are applicable to 
identifiable elements or segments of the entity or are pervasive). The auditor's 
initial consideration of mitigating factors is based primarily on (a) knowledge of 
matters that relate to the nature of the entity's business and its operating 
characteristics and of matters affecting the industry in which it operates, 
including an awareness of the specific effects and general influence of 
international, national, and local economic conditions, (b) discussions with 
principal officers having responsibility for administration, finance, operations, 
and accounting activities, and (c) understanding of possible legal implications, if 
any, based on discussions with appropriate legal counsel when that is deemed 
necessary. 
Consideration of Management Plans 
8. Additional considerations often are necessary; they generally focus on 
management plans that are responsive to the observed conditions that resulted 
in the contrary information. The relevance of such plans to an auditor generally 
decreases as the time period for planned actions and anticipated events 
increases, although longer time periods may be more meaningful in industries 
with a lengthy operating cycle. Particular emphasis ordinarily is placed on plans 
that might have a significant effect on the entity's solvency within a period of 
one year following the date of the financial statements on which the auditor is 
currently reporting. The auditor's considerations relating to such management 
plans may include the following. 
a. Plans to liquidate assets: 
• Apparent marketability of the assets that management plans to sell. 
• Restrictions on the disposal of assets, such as covenants limiting such 
transactions in loan or similar agreements or encumbrances against 
assets. 
• Possible direct and indirect effects of the disposal of assets. 
b. Plans to borrow money or restructure debt: 
• Availability of debt financing, including existing or committed credit 
arrangements, such as lines of credit and arrangements for factoring 
receivables or sale-leaseback of assets. 
• Existing or committed arrangements to restructure or subordinate 
debt or to guarantee loans to the entity. 
• Possible effects on management's borrowing plans of existing re-
strictions on additional borrowing and the sufficiency of available 
collateral. 
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c. Plans to reduce or delay expenditures: 
• Apparent feasibility of plans to reduce overhead and administrative 
expenditures, to postpone maintenance or research and development 
projects, or to lease rather than purchase assets. 
• Possible direct and indirect effects of reduced or delayed expendi-
tures. 
d. Plans to increase ownership equity: 
• Apparent feasibility of plans to increase ownership equity, including 
existing or committed arrangements to raise additional capital. 
• Existing or committed arrangements to reduce current dividend 
requirements or to accelerate cash distributions from affiliates or 
other investees. 
9. The auditor also should discuss with management any forecasts, 
projections, budgets, or other prospective data, particularly data relating to 
cash flows, that are available or that can reasonably be developed and that are 
relevant in relation to the plans discussed in paragraph 8. The auditor should 
consider the support for significant assumptions underlying the prospective 
data and should give particular attention to assumptions that are 
• Material to the relevant forecasts or projections. 
• Especially uncertain or sensitive to variations. 
• In deviation from historical trends. 
The auditor's considerations should be based on (a) reading of the prospective 
data and the underlying assumptions, (b) knowledge of the entity, its business, 
and its management, and (c) comparison of prospective data in prior periods 
with historical results and of prospective data for the current forecast period 
with results achieved to date. If the auditor becomes aware of relevant factors 
the effects of which are not reflected in such prospective data, he should also 
take those factors into account. The auditor's function, however, does not 
include predicting the outcome of future events, and an unqualified opinion on 
the financial statements does not constitute a guarantee or assurance by the 
auditor that the entity has the ability to continue for any particular period 
beyond the date of his opinion. 
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